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In 1900, disillusioned with high-powered newspaper work and weary of 
cities, progressive journalist Ray Stannard Baker quit New York and fled to 
Arizona. Going west to find himself was a gesture of affiliation sanctified by both 
national myth and his family folklore of pioneer stock ancestry and his father's 
move west to start over after failing in business. 
But the Arizona deserts had no power to heal him. In his memoirs he 
recounted a moment of reckoning with the omnipotence of crowds: he could not 
forget the congestion that lay just beyond the horizon. For better or worse, to him 
America was epitomized by suffocating New York: 
What a different world I knew from that of my ancestors! They 
had the wilderness, I had crowds. I found teeming, josding, 
restless cities; I found immense smoking, roaring industries; I 
found a labyrinth of tangled communication. I found hugeness 
and evil.1 
Baker decided that learning to navigate this world of crowds would be "the prime 
test" of the modern citizen. 
E. A. Ross had a grimmer and more intellectualized encounter with crowds. 
In 1894, he jotted down "thirty-three distinct means by which society controls its 
members" in a list that became twenty American Journal of Sociology articles and 
the popular book Social Control (1901).2 Ross' work grew from his assumption, 
shared with Frederick Jackson Turner, that the closing of the frontier would 
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inaugurate a difficult new epoch for America. There had once been a time, Ross 
wrote, when order emerged spontaneously from the 'sense of justice' among 
equals. The conditions for this state of grace appeared briefly in the American 
West, where men were men and mostfy Anglo-Saxons, and where nature was 
virgin and lavishly bountiful. His prize exhibit was the elemental democracy that 
supposedly flourished in the first California mining camps.3 Even as he ached for 
this Eden, Ross acknowledged that progress doomed it. "The equality that gives 
homesteaders or golddiggers a few Arcadian days without bolt or bar, state or law, 
soon passes away."4 Western land and gold attracted swarms of settlers who 
required the artifices of social control. 
In dense modern cities, Ross believed, people increasingly exhibited a 
primitive "suggestibility," the disposition to act automatically on ideas offered by 
their fellows. For certain animals species this kind of imitative behavior was 
adaptive, enabling them to act collectively to confront danger, but among humans 
it was dangerous, for it easily degenerated into the hyper-suggestibility that Ross 
called "the mob mind." 
One remedy was to restore the pride and critical faculties of the individual. 
In an article titled "The Mob Mind" Ross wrote: 
Democracy's ideal is a society of men with neither the 'back'-
look on the past nor yet the 'out'-look on their fellows, but with 
the 'in'-look upon reason and conscience. We must hold fast 
to a sage Emersonian individualism, that... shall brace men 
to stand against the rush of the mass.5 
In Social Control, however, Ross concentrated on showing how the suggestible 
"mass" could be molded into a post-democratic social order. Americans had long 
enjoyed the luxury of sneering at leaders. "But when population thickens, 
interests clash, and difficult problems of mutual adjustment becoming pressing, 
it is foolish and dangerous not to follow the lead of superior men." The Anglo-
Saxon males who had once lorded alone over Western prairies now had to become 
the brains of a complex and volatile society that included women, children and 
mongrel breeds. 
There was a snag: "The power of the Few to take the role of the social 
cerebrum depends entirely upon how far the Many capitulate to it." But if the Few 
could harness the suggestibility of the Many, they could not only resist "the rush 
of the mass" but capture its energy. Ross painted suggestion as the master 
instrument by which "the stubborn individual will is bent to the social purpose." 
It was an instrument of frightening power, for it could "reduce men to uniformity 
as a steam roller reduces bits of stone to smooth macadam."6 
For Baker, Ross and others of their class and generation, nostalgia for a 
prelapsarian age of open spaces, geographical and social, collided with the 
unblinkable facts of the Many. Alongside the myth of the frontier as defining the 
America then rapidly being lost, there arose anxious speculations about urban 
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hordes who would define the American future. Even democrats instinctively 
recoiled from the crowd and applied to it a vocabulary born of distance and 
disparagement. "The language of 'masses/" writes Asa Briggs, ". . . raises 
awkward separations—between 'them' and 'us'; 'above' and 'below'; 'brains 
and numbers' ; 'individuals and crowds. '"7 Instinctively, too, men like Baker and 
Ross adopted a "dominative attitude to communication" that sprang from "the 
conception of persons as masses," in Raymond Williams' words; for if one's 
"purpose is manipulation—the persuasion of a large number of people to act, feel, 
think, know in certain ways—the convenient formula will be that of the masses."8 
Finally, the quest to understand and control the masses culminated in the 
invention of "crowd psychology," the first systematic interpretation of what later 
generations would call "the mass society." My subject is the origins and career 
of this early effort to come to terms with the Many in modern America. 
* * * 
Though Ray Stannard Baker liked to think his ancestors lived in a less 
volatile and congested America, they too "had crowds" and learned to live with 
them. In eighteenth-century America riotous crowds enjoyed a tolerance, even 
a "quasi legitimacy," that derived from Whig principles, the weakness of colonial 
governments, and their defense of community values. Even Thomas Hutchinson, 
the lieutenant governor of Massachusetts who was a principal victim of the 1765 
Stamp Act riots, could observe that "Mobs, a sort of them, at least, are constitu-
tional."9 
The Revolution made mobs more controversial. For republicans who 
revered the principles of Tom Paine and Thomas Jefferson, crowds epitomized 
the egalitarian, voluntary social relations that were replacing the hierarchical and 
authoritarian patterns of the Old World. For skeptical elites, crowds were the 
mobile vidgus, the face of chaos behind the smiling mask of republicanism. 
"There are combustibles in every State," George Washington told a correspon-
dent in reference to Shays' Rebellion in 1786, "which a spark might set fire 
to I feel... infinitely more than I can express to you, for the disorders, which 
have arisen in these States. Good God! Who, besides a Tory, could have foreseen, 
or a Briton predicted them?" The case grew more desperate when many of these 
combustibles showed a taste for the Jacobin principles of the more profound 
revolution taking place in France.10 
Yet mobs of common folk, often with patrician leaders, had undeniably 
assisted at the birth of the nation. The identity of the new republic was bound up 
with the promise that the hoipolloi would become full citizens. Wary Federalists 
joined Jeffersonians in embracing this prospect, albeit with reservations. In 1805 
an editorial writer articulated a distinction that would be enshrined at the center 
of nineteenth-century political culture, 
between the people and the mob or populace. By the latter I 
designate certain of the lowest class in the community, who are 
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alike destitute of property and principle, and may be emphati-
cally stiled [sic] thzrabble Bypeoplelmean the great body 
of American farmers, merchants, mechanics, etc.11 
During the first decades of the nineteenth century this distinction proved easy 
to sustain. Respectable citizens vastly outnumbered the riotous rabble. There 
were occasional outbreaks of mob violence, notably in Baltimore in 1812, but no 
recurrence of potentially insurrectionary activity in the manner of Shays' Rebel-
lion or the Whiskey Rebellion. 
By the 1820s however, the circumstances that had calmed fears of mobs 
began to change. Burgeoning cities, the beginnings of a proletariat, creation of 
an Irish immigrant underclass, Jacksonian politics, and intensifying agitation 
against slavery, all created social frictions that multiplied crowds and made them 
more menacing. In a divided society, notes Paul Gilje, "any mob action was 
anathema because it threatened to loosen the bonds that held the disparate 
elements of society together "12 
Quite apart from the urban rabble and their riots, the great American 
majority—"the people" themselves—seemed increasingly prone to crowdish 
behavior. Though farmers, merchants and mechanics seldom rioted, they were 
alleged to be conformist and suggestible, and democratic notions made them 
insolent and ambitious as well. They exerted influence by sheer weight of 
numbers while holding in reserve the weapon of mob coercion. John Stuart Mill 
described the peril in his essay On Liberty (1859): 
At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is 
almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the 
world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses 
and of governments while they make themselves the organ of 
the tendencies and instincts of the masses.13 
It was this leveling crowd, "a countless mass of similar and equal men who 
tirelessly gyrate upon themselves in order to procure the vulgar little pleasures 
with which to fill their souls," that Tocqueville considered the poison fruit of 
democracy. He decided that the United States had erected adequate constitutional 
protections against political tyranny of the majority. However, the moral and 
cultural depredations of the majority were harder to check. In 'The American 
Scholar" of 1837 Emerson voiced a complaint that intellectuals would endlessly 
elaborate through the rest of the century, and that prefigured critiques of the "mass 
society" in the century to come: "Men are become of no account. Men in history, 
men in the world of today, are bugs, are spawn, and are called 'the mass' and 'the 
herd.'"14 
But in egalitarian and entrepreneurial America such disparagements repre-
sented a minority point of view. Though mobs were reviled, the mass had plenty 
of advocates. Enterprising souls in all walks of life learned to live with it, and 
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indeed on it. For showmen like P. T. Barnum, for merchandisers like A. T. 
Stewart, for publishers like James Gordon Bennett, and for virtually every 
politician after Jackson, the "rush of the mass" pointed the way to wealth, prestige 
and power. 
The career of Henry Ward Beecher is illustrative. While Emerson was 
quitting his ministry and beckoning young men to come away from the herd, 
Beecher was rejoicing in his ability to enthrall the multitudes. Newly installed in 
a pulpit in Indianapolis, Beecher described the society of the Mississippi Valley 
as a 
vast mass of heterogeneous population—sharp minded—and 
sharp in temper—enterprising—and not discreet—given to 
excitement and to passions—breaking out into tumults, riots— 
mobs verging to the very edge of the civil war, 
subject to manipulation "by base men, by desperate men, by wolfish demagogues 
and foxish priests,..." But far from fearing chaos in this scene, Beecher defined 
it as a field of opportunity for his healing oratory. At the Plymouth Church in 
Brooklyn, where he was called in 1845, Beecher replaced the high pulpit with an 
armchair that brought him closer to the congregation, and eventually he designed 
an amphitheater of pews into which his preaching platform projected. Years later, 
this most acclaimed of American clergymen declared that his church was "built 
on a principle—the principle of social and personal magnetism, which emanates 
reciprocally from a speaker and from a close throng of hearers I want them 
to surround me, so that they will come up on every side, and behind me, so that 
I shall be in the center of the crowd, and have the people surge all about me!"15 
The Civil War gave Emerson a new respect for the crowd. The firing on Fort 
Sumter generated a "whirlwind of patriotism" capable of "magnetizing all 
discordant masses under its terrific unity." The Sage of Concord told a lecture 
audience, 
. . . now a sentiment mightier than logic, wide as light, strong 
as gravity, reaches into the college, the bank, the farm-house, 
and the church. Itis the day of the populace; they are wiser than 
their teachers I will never again speak lightly of a crowd.16 
Yet in the middle of the War the brutal New York draft riots gave notice that 
segments of "the discordant masses" were prepared to cast patriotism aside and 
assert themselves in defense of class interests. During the Gilded Age, mobs 
again came to be dreaded as rehearsals for insurrection, instigated now by 
Communists rather than by Jacobins. At the height of the railroad strikes of 1877 
the New York Times warned, 
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We are gradually acquiring those elements of vice and lawless-
ness which we had fondly hoped were confined to the older and 
less liberal countries of Europe It is nonsense to talk of the 
socialist revolt which is the standing danger of older countries 
being a visionary peril here, when one great city after another 
falls without a blow under the control of a mob of reckless and 
law-defying men.17 
Defining rioters as aliens and outlaws, military men thought it superfluous 
to analyze their motives and futile to reason with them. An authority on riot 
control noted in 1882 that the old-fashioned kind of riot, a "sudden outburst of 
passion soon satiated," had given way to insurrectionary disorders perpetrated by 
"'roughs, tramps, and unknown men,' anarchists and thieves," which demanded 
merciless repression. When the moment for use of firepower arrived, he wrote, 
"all false sympathy should cease, and the offenders be looked upon not as 
American citizens, but as felons and murderers."18 
Yet the protestors of the 1890s were too numerous and too various to be shot 
to pieces. Epic strikes in Pennsylvania and Chicago and the Rockies, the Alliance 
and Populist crusades, the Bryan campaign, these and other mammoth move-
ments could not be dismissed as the workings of criminality or communism. The 
spread of the increasingly organized collective behavior of the 1890s inspired 
inquiries into its causes and dynamics. One informal student of crowds was Ray 
Stannard Baker, who as a young journalist witnessed many mass protests at close 
range. 
Fresh from the University of Michigan, Baker went to work in 1893 for the 
Chicago Record, which assigned him to cover the "army" being recruited by 
Jacob Coxey of Massillon, Ohio. Baker soon realized that the "Commonweal of 
Christ" (the army's official name) was no apparition from the lunatic fringe. It 
included few of the "tramps and hangers-on" whom he hadregarded as the natural 
recruits for mobs. Most marchers were simply farmers and industrial wage-
earners down on their luck. "I am beginning to feel," he told his editor, "that the 
movement has some meaning, that it is a manifestation of the prevailing unrest 
and dissatisfaction among the laboring classes."19 
By the time the Commonweal of Christ arrived in Washington, Baker's 
initial skepticism had turned into a guarded admiration. When Coxey's chief 
lieutenant tried to break through police lines at the Capital, mounted officers 
"dashed into the wildly shrieking crowd. . . . Some of them [the police] 
completely lost their heads and used their clubs right and left." His lieutenant was 
collared, Coxey was arrested, and the bedraggled Commonweal "vanished in thin 
air." Before it disappeared, Coxey's army had blurred for Baker the boundary 
between mobs and the authorities who defined them as mobs.20 
The boundary held firm, however, when protesting crowds were made up of 
strikers. Covering a walkout by Slavic employees of the Frick Coke Company 
in Pennsylvania, Baker saw mobs acting as stereotypes of alien proletarians had 
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trained him to expect "Its [sic] not a pleasant job to track around after a mob of 
half-drunken, bloodthirsty Huns and Slavs who can't speak a word of English," 
he told his father. At one point Baker was "captured" by strikers, like a scout 
grabbed by Plains Indians, and "narrowly escaped being mobbed myself." Back 
in Chicago in July 1894, Baker initially professed sympathy for the American 
Railway Union as it battled the Pullman Company, perhaps because few ARU 
members were "Huns and Slavs." However, 
when I saw huge mobs running wild, defying the officers of the 
law, putting the torch to millions of dollars' worth of prop-
erty—I was still more perplexed. Could such anarchy be 
permitted in a civilized society?21 
Another kind of crowd behavior that dismayed Baker was the adulation 
bestowed on William Jennings Bryan. Bryan had a charismatic appeal that 
seemed capable of mobilizing millions of aggrieved Americans. But what was 
it? Baker later remembered trying to write up an impromptu speech he heard 
Bryan give in a packed hotel room during the 1896 presidential campaign: 
. . . I was surprised to find how little there was to get hold of. 
It had appreciation and devotion and inspiration, and a 'clarion 
call to battle,' as he himself expressed it, and it went straight to 
the hearts of his hearers—without hurting their heads.22 
In Bryan's vapid demagoguery, as in other kinds of crowd phenomena, there 
seemed more magic than reason. Baker's observations imbued in him a cautious 
skepticism regarding the shibboleths about mobs and masses, but gave him no key 
to understanding them. 
* * * 
As Ray Stannard Baker was discovering the mysteries of crowds, a new 
"scientific" instrument for interpreting collective behavior was just beginning to 
gain public attention. In December 1894, a writer in the Atlantic Monthly 
observed, 
The 'psychology of crowds,' which has recently begun to 
enlist the attention of Italian and French psycho-physiologists, 
is destined, haply, to throw a great deal of light on the far-
reaching results of every personal state of mind; on the manner 
in which we all, normally, hang together. 
Three months later the Atlantic published the first contribution to "crowd 
psychology" written in America, an essay titled "A Study of the Mob" by a 
Russian immigrant and Harvard graduate named Boris Sidis. Bearing the 
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prestige of science, crowd psychology was quickly recruited to defend the 
interests of patriotism, property and order on both sides of the Atlantic.23 
To the degree that crowd psychology had an authentic scientific foundation, 
it lay in studies of suggestibility and hypnotism conducted by French investiga-
tors during the 1880s. The alleged human disposition to respond automatically 
to "suggestions," demonstrated most vividly in hypnotic states, was then the great 
new continent being mapped by explorers of the unconscious. By comparison 
Eros had barely been sighted. 'The rise of hypnotism in late years," wrote the 
Princeton psychologist James Mark Baldwin in 1895, "has opened the way in an 
entirely new method of mental study." John Dewey later recalled that the 
"suggestibility school" dominated the whole field of social psychology and 
"almost sociology" as well during the decade before World War I.24 
Investigators agreed that hypnotism produced a state in which a person's 
attention became focused on the hypnotist, causing him or her automatically to 
heed the hypnotist's commands or "suggestions." But on the essential nature of 
hypnotic trance there was sharp division. Jean Martin Charcot, celebrated 
neurologist at the Salpetriere Hospital and leader of the "Paris school," concluded 
that only diseased minds could be hypnotized. He regarded hypnosis as an 
important symptom of hysteria. A. A. Liebeault and Hippoly te Bernheim, leaders 
of the "Nancy school," contended that anyone could be hypnotized because 
hypnosis was merely an exaggerated expression of the mind's normal 
"ideodynamism," the natural tendency to believe any idea or perform any action 
unless contrary ideas intervene.25 
By 1890 the Nancy school had triumphed over Paris. Even Charcot's chief 
disciple, Pierre Janet, conceded that suggestibility was part of the mind's normal 
repertoire of tendencies and need not be symptomatic of disease. To the contrary, 
Bernheim and others hailed suggestibility as a miraculous therapeutic tool. Using 
hypnotic suggestions they claimed they could cure a host of physical and 
psychological maladies.26 
Suggestion theory was also summoned to diagnose and cure a very different 
sort of ailment, the alleged vulnerability of modern societies to collective 
frenzies. The seminal text of the new "crowd psychology" came not from 
psychology but from history: Hippolyte Taine's bitterly anti-Jacobin Origins of 
Contemporary France, which portrayed the French Revolution as a calamitous 
reversion to savagery. In a crowd, wrote Taine, "mutual contagion inflames the 
passions; crowds... end in a state of drunkenness, from which nothing can issue 
but vertigo and blind rage."27 Though his subject was the Revolution of 1789, 
Taine's interpretation of crowds also drew upon bitter memories of Parisian mobs 
in 1830,1848 and especially in 1871, when the Commune had briefly resurrected 
the specter of the Revolution. 
The crowd psychologists argued that collective hypnosis explained the 
behavior of Taine's crowds. In 1895 Gustave Le Bon published the most 
imaginative and widely-read exposition of crowd psychology, titled simply The 
Crowd, According to Le Bon 
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An individual immerged [sic] for some length of time in a 
crowd soon finds himself.. . in a special state, which much 
resembles the state of fascination in which the hypnotized 
individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotizer. 
Passing under the dominion of a primitive "unconscious personality," a person in 
a crowd becomes "an automaton who has ceased to be guided by his will."28 
Le Bon and other crowd psychologists professed interest in behavioral traits 
common to all human aggregations. But the crowds that most concerned them 
were assemblies of the newly enfranchised masses. It was invariably groups of 
plebeians (especially workers) and democratic politicians (especially parlia-
ments) that furnished the crowd psychologists with their examples of collective 
behavior, and invariably those examples were described as criminal, pathological 
or degenerate. 
In reality crowd psychology owed less to psychology than to conservative 
politics. Le Bon's images of the mob (like Taine's before them) inverted Marxist 
images of a heroic working class. Crowd psychology denied to working people 
the dignity, autonomy and revolutionary creativity that Marx and other thinkers 
of the Left conferred on them. Hypnotic explanations stigmatized crowds; they 
turned motives into impulses and politics into pathology.29 
The French crowd psychologists were particularly disturbed by rebellious 
stirrings of the working class that included huge strikes in 1884 and 1886, 
socialist-sponsored demonstrations on the first May Day in 1890, a massacre of 
striking textile workers at Fourmies on May Day of 1891, and the election of fifty 
socialists to the Chamber of Deputies in 1893. All of these events and trends were 
ascribed to a veritable epidemic of crowd madness. Gustave Le Bon succinctly 
stated the thesis of his book The Crowd: 'The substitution of the unconscious 
action of crowds for the conscious activity of individuals is one of the principal 
characteristics of the present age."30 
In the hands of its shrewder adepts, crowd psychology became an instrument 
of adaptation to the new regime of enfranchised masses. According to Le Bon, 
crowds were fundamentally conservative organisms, because the primitive 
unconscious that rose to the surface in crowds housed not just a fickle suggest-
ibility, but also the "genius of the race," "mysterious forces which the ancients 
denominated destiny, nature, or providence " Hypnotized by a Robespierre 
or a socialist agitator, the crowd was despicable; but under the spell of a leader 
who could summon forth the race-genius, the crowd became creative, even 
heroic. "The world's masters... have always been unconscious psychologists, 
possessed of an instinctive and often very sure knowledge of the characteristics 
of crowds " Le Bon presented himself as a Machiavellian counselor to modern 
princes who possessed the courage and will to reimpose order on the straying 
masses.31 
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* * * 
Many American academics greeted European crowd theories with skepti-
cism. James Mark Baldwin called "the attempt to build a fruitful conception of 
society" on observations of crowd behavior "crude and unphilosophical in the 
extreme." In areview of The Crowd William James rejected Le Bon's insinuation 
that "all the feelings that move men together... are more or less irrational and 
insane." Moreover, in American politics the democratic ethos militated against 
crowd psychology; here there were no parties of reaction to espouse Le Bonian 
principles.32 
Nonetheless, the appeal of crowd theories grew in proportion to the preva-
lence of collective behavior in American life. Crowd psychology enjoyed a brief 
vogue in the fledgling disciplines of social psychology and sociology at the turn 
of the century. More significant was the part that crowd psychology played in 
delegitimizing working-class protests and mass entertainment. Notions about the 
irrational suggestibility of people in groups became staples of popular lore about 
the mind, and crowd psychology as a whole paved the way for theories of the 
"mass society" that emerged later in the century. 
Ironically, it was William James who nurtured America's only original 
crowd psychologist, the Russian emigre Boris Sidis, who earned a doctorate 
under James' directionin 1897. Theearly career of crowdpsychology in America 
was closely bound up with Sidis' ideas. 
Bom in Kiev in 1867, Sidis grew up a rebel against his family's Judaism and 
the Romanov dynasty. After being imprisoned for anti-Czarist agitation and then 
put under police surveillance, Sidis emigrated, first to France and then, in 1887, 
to the United States. Supporting himself as a shirtmaker and a tutor to fellow 
immigrants, he entered Harvard as a special student in 1892. The philosopher 
Josiah Royce wrote a satiric sketch of his dealings with the ambitious young 
immigrant: 
He has read absolutely everything radical, and in Russian too, 
so that you cannot refute him. He is already a terror of my life. 
After lectures he gathers around me, outstays all other ques-
tioners, and talks Darwin, Spencer, idealism, mathematics, 
socialism,—everything, till I flee. Then he accompanies me 
homewards. My brain whirls, I groan inwardly, I long for a 
little deep interstellar silence,—but in vain. At last, as I hurry 
and hobble along, hastening to be free, he says kindly, 'But I 
detain you.' *No, no,' I cry, and to prove it take to my heels. 
. . . At night, whenever the floors crack, I lie dreading the 
emissaries of the Russian police who, as I doubt not, are 
already spying on this ill-starred intimacy.33 
After earning his B. A., Sidis took up graduate study in psychology under 
James and Hugo Munsterberg. He published his thesis in l&9$asThe Psychology 
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of Suggestion. The book bore a generous introduction by James, who privately 
told his young protege that the work was "bold, original, and radical like yourself, 
and I like it."34 
Sidis began a career in psychopathology that quickly vindicated the faith of 
his mentor. His second book, on mental dissociation, was based on years of 
clinical studies. In 1904 Sidis returned to Harvard to take a medical degree, after 
which a wealthy patroness helped him open his own Psychotherapeutic Institute 
in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He published prolifically on topics ranging from 
multiple personality to the function of laughter and joined a circle of Boston 
psychiatrists grouped around Morton Prince's new Journal of Abnormal Psy-
chology.35 
Prince acclaimed Sidis as the only American explorer of the unconscious fit 
to stand alongside such eminent Europeans as Charcot, Janet, Breuer and Freud. 
But Sidis' reputation disintegrated after he chose to make a prudish stand against 
the Freudians. He called psychoanalysis "but another aspect of the pious quack 
literature on sexual subjects" and a "worship of Venus and Priapus." Unable to 
halt the Freudian tide, Sidis lived long enough to see it drown his own prestige and 
influence.36 
In The Psychology of Suggestion Sidis advanced the theory that virtually all 
social behavior is the product of suggestibility. Building on the work of 
Bernheim, Janet and Alfred Binet, Sidis reported that he had confirmed the 
existence in the mind of a "subwaking self by 3000 experiments, 800 of them 
performed on himself. It is this subwaking self, lurking beneath the rational 
consciousness or "waking self," that is the "highway of suggestibility." As long 
as the waking self is intact and the mental "cleft" that separates it from the 
subwaking self remains shallow, the waking self polices its alter ego and prevents 
it from accepting most suggestions. When, however, the two selves drift apart, 
becoming highly "disaggregated" as they do under the influence of hysteria or 
hypnosis, the waking self loses control. Freed of censorship, the subwaking self 
takes command of the mind, and "normal suggestibility" gives way to abnormal-
ity.37 
Sidis used images of trespass, subversion and cannibalism to describe the 
working of the suggestible subwaking self. It is a lesion prone to social infection, 
an "evil Jinnee," a chameleon that 
lacks all personality and individuality; it is absolutely servile; 
it works according to no maxim; it has no moral law, no law at 
all The subwaking self has no will; it is blown hither and 
thither by all sorts of incoming suggestions.38 
It is this part of the mind that opens it to every kind of social influence and betrays 
it to the mob. "Out of the subwaking selves the mob-self springs into being," Sidis 
declared. As James remarked, The Psychology of Suggestion provided one of the 
first and fullest expositions of crowd psychology in English.39 
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Sidis traced his initial interest in collective behavior to memories of pogroms 
in his native Russia. Mob conduct must be understood, he asserted, as the result 
of "social hypnotization." 'The man of the mob" undergoes the same "entire loss 
of his personal self and lapses into the same obedient state that is observed in 
hypnotized individuals. According to Sidis, any limits on individuals' freedom 
of action may breed hypnosis and mob behavior. Thus Czarist tyranny and rigid 
class barriers helped to make Russia "an immense theatre for hypnotic scenes," 
including the horrific assaults on the Jews.40 
Sidis soon decided that the mob menace transcended conditions peculiar to 
Russia. In The Psychology of Suggestion he introduced a startling new analysis 
of collective behavior: "Society in general and democracy in particular" generate 
mob phenomena. Sidis now suggested that democratic social controls could 
crush individuality and induce hypnotic trances just as efficiently as the Romanov 
police. Any complex society, in fact, required the kind of restraints on personal 
freedom that the hypnotist imposes. From this Sidis concluded, 'The laws of 
hypnosis work on a great scale in society Society and mental epidemics are 
intimately related "41 
Warming to his theme, Sidis showed how virtually every kind of popular 
movement in Western history, from the crusades to financial crazes, could be 
interpreted as a mental epidemic caused by "extreme suggestibility." He warned 
Americans against supposing themselves immune to such follies. Reviewing the 
record of revivals and other movements in his adopted country, Sidis proclaimed 
that the United States seemed "to suffer from circular insanity."42 
This was strong stuff, but no one called Sidis a crackpot. In the intellectual 
climate of the time, extremism in defense of the waking self was no vice. 
Moreover, Sidis came armed with the imprimaturs of James, Harvard and 
empirical science (the 3000 experiments). The Psychology of Suggestion 
contributed substantially to the vogue of what Dewey called "the suggestibility 
school" in the American social sciences during the first years of the new century. 
Sidis' doctrines gained their largest audience through the writings of E. A. 
Ross, the most widely-read social scientist of his day. Ross' 1897 article on "The 
Mob Mind" depended heavily on Sidis' early magazine pieces, and The Psychol-
ogy of Suggestion furnished the theoretical foundations for Ross' chapters on 
suggestibility in Social Control (1901). For his popular 1908 textbook Social 
Psychology, Ross relied principally on Gabriel Tarde, but he also borrowed 
liberally (usually without attribution) from The Psychology of Suggestion. For 
example, Ross treated suggestibility in unmistakably Sidisian terms as a weak-
ness that betrays the waking self to social influence. When the "captain of the 
ship" manages to 
fight back the mutinous crew that swarm up from the fore-
castles—the appetites and passions—and to hold the ship to 
her course in spite of sidewinds and cross-currents—sugges-
tions from without—we have a character. If, now, this primary 
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self is overthrown or put to sleep, the subwaking self becomes 
master of the ship.43 
Ross' pupils also drew upon Sidis. In 1919 Robert Gault wrote a vigorous 
defense of suggestibility as a sociological concept, citing The Psychology of 
Suggestion as a seminal text. Gault published his own Social Psychology, heavily 
indebted to Ross and Sidis, in 1923. The following year Emory S. Bogardus 
brought out another text, dedicated to Ross, that gave respectful attention to 
Sidis.44 
Students of religious psychology were especially intrigued by Sidis' analysis 
of the "mob mind." Both Edwin Diller S tarbuck and Frederick Davenport found 
in The Psychology of Suggestion a persuasive model for explaining the irrational-
ism of evangelical piety.45 
But if contemporaries borrowed selected propositions from Sidis, they shied 
away from his alarmist generalizations. And outside of the academy, Sidis' 
writings on crowd psychology had less impact than those of Gustave Le Bon. This 
was true in large part because The Psychology of Suggestion was a book published 
slightly behind its time. It appears two years after the climactic national election 
in which McKinley and Mark Hanna turned back Bryan, a symbolic triumph by 
the legions of patriotism, capitalism and order over the anarchic mob menace. By 
1898, Populists, radical labor organizations and other dissident groups were in 
disarray, the depression was over, and much of the nation had been distracted 
from domestic dissension by a more congenial preoccupation with the war against 
Spain. Sidis implicitly acknowledged the taming of the American mob by picking 
revivals—a politically innocuous form of collective behavior—as his main 
illustration of modern "mental epidemics," while ignoring strikes and the other 
expressions of working-class militancy that had caused consternation since the 
1870s. 
This supposition that violent collective behavior was waning in America had 
hardly any truth to it. Certainly there was no sign that lynch mobs, the most 
vicious kind of crowds, were dying out. To the contrary, more lynchings (of 
whites as well as blacks) were recorded during the 1890s than in any other decade, 
and though lynchings would diminish somewhat during the following decade, the 
frequency of major race riots would actually increase. Despite courageous anti-
lynching campaigns led by Ida Wells-Barnett and others, a profoundly racist 
society continued to tolerate lynch mobs as justifiable means of defending 
community norms.46 It appears, then, that hyperbolic crowd theories of the kind 
purveyed by Sidis fell from favor less because they contradicted facts than 
because they collided with political fashion. And at the turn of the century a rising 
fashion, promoted by a wishful progressivism, was to assert that American 
society had evolved to a state of maturity that made violent protests and wayward 
crowds obsolete. 
The principal threats to civilization were no longer deemed to be the 
collective frenzies that Sidis professed to explain. Attention was shifting back to 
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the great sluggish mass whose Philistinism and intolerance had troubled 
Tocqueville and Emerson. Now that overt disorders had supposedly passed, a 
torpid and suffocating order was identified as the imminent peril. The "mental 
epidemic" looming over the new century was not a revolutionary mob but a 
relentless mass, not a bomb but a steamroller. 
It was by offering to help define and control this new entity—what a later 
generation would call the "mass society"—that crowd psychology made its 
deepest impression in the United States. Ideas borrowed from crowd psychology 
helped sponsor a momentous transition in American social criticism, from 
preoccupation with the strikers and rebels of the 1890s to fascination with the 
Babbitts and movie fans of the 1910s and 1920s. 
It is difficult to document this transition because the concepts and terms 
applied to collective behavior remained highly imprecise. The epithets "crowd" 
and "mob" were stuck indiscriminately on both concentrations of people (the mob 
proper) and bodies of physically separated individuals (the mass). To a degree 
this promiscuity of terms reflected the belief that these two kinds of aggregates 
shared characteristics. Both mob and mass were described as anonymous, 
unorganized, gullible and low in taste. The mass was sometimes conceived as the 
soil in which the seeds of mob behavior lay dormant.47 
On the whole, however, after the tumultuous 1890s the accent was thrown on 
differences between mob and mass that recalled the old distinction between 
"rabble" and "people." Whereas the mob was physically compact, homogeneous, 
frenetic, and fickle, the mass was dispersed, heterogeneous, phlegmatic and 
resistant to change. Neither mob nor mass showed human nature in a flattering 
light. But in one crucial respect the mass seemed clearly superior: Whereas a mob 
was anarchic, the mass could be managed. For this reason many commentators 
saw in the rise of the "mass society" a pledge of progress, contingent on the 
capacity of elites to learn the new arts of mass persuasion. 
The leading theorist of the mass (though he never used that term) was 
Gustave Le Bon's rival in the French academy, the criminologist and sociologist 
Gabriel Tarde. In an 1898 article that he would later expand into a book, Tarde 
castigated Le Bon for exaggerating the significance of crowds. Modern means 
of communication and transportation were rapidly replacing the "primitive 
congregation of crowds" with a new kind of social entity that he called the 
"public." Tarde defined the public as an "intellectual collectivity, a scattering of 
physically separated individuals whose cohesion is only mental." Like a crowd, 
a public exhibited marked suggestibility of ideas and emotions, but its suggest-
ibility made for cohesion rather than disruption. This was true because in the 
physically dispersed public there was "contagion without contact"—enough 
interaction among individuals to unify them, not enough to excite them. "The 
formation of a public," wrote Tarde, "presupposes a mental and social evolution 
much more advanced than the formation of a crowd"; the public was more 
rational, pacific and respectable. Thus the public was resistant to anarchy. But 
it was vulnerable to tyranny, Tarde believed, for its very stability and passivity 
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increased its serviceability as a medium of suggestion. Lacking structure and 
natural leaders, the public's defenselessness fostered "mass manipulation on an 
unprecedented scale." Tarde was especially sensitive to the dangers of a 
"homogenization of culture through the press." At the turn of the century this 
critique of democratic mass society, with its Tocquevillian emphasis on the 
dangers of majority tyranny, seemed more relevant to the American situation than 
Sidis' paranoid rantings.48 
After the turn of the century, troops of Emersonian moralists filled the 
middle-class monthlies with dyspeptic reflections on the mediocrity and timo-
rousness of the mass. Schools, department stores, the press and other organs of 
social homogenization had grown so efficient, one writer typically warned in 
1904, that Americans approached an "absolute sameness." 
Following the mode... has grown so easy that, moving in the 
direction of least resistance, we are fast reaching a complete 
abdication of individual rights, a sheeplike acceptance of every 
diversion, form of instruction, or way of life labeled 'the 
latest.' And after all, instead of making us free, these material 
advances have ended by creating a power which is relentlessly 
herding us into flocks and droves, to be led hither and yon 
without our exercising a spark of independent volition. 
In the same vein Clayton Hamilton held "theatre crowds" to be so simple-minded 
that only simple-minded plays could please them, and Henry Dwight Sedgwick 
decried the depressing effect on literature of the "upper bourgeois novel-reading 
mob."49 
Clearly sheeplike shoppers and "reading mobs" differed in class background 
from strikers and rioters. Such groups suffered from surfeit, not deprivation, and 
if they had somehow caught the crowd virus from the working class, in them it 
produced markedly different symptoms. In the proletariat the disease produced 
the volatility of the mob; in the bourgeoisie it manifested itself as the passivity of 
the mass. Among wage-earners crowd qualities corrupted the mind, turning 
people into madmen or beasts; among people of property and education crowd 
qualities weakened the character, making individuals into conformists. Thus in 
migrating from the rabble to respectable folk, habits of collective behavior 
allegedly became more temperate. But they had the insidious effect of rendering 
respectables less able to exercise—or to justify—social leadership. 
Critics who lamented bourgeois conformism in the years 1900-1910 were 
resurrecting complaints that had been made familiar a half-century earlier. 
During the last decades of the nineteenth century, anxieties about the integrity of 
the individual had temporarily yielded priority to fears for the integrity of a social 
order supposedly besieged by rebellious wage-earners. Now, following the 
industrial battles of the 1890s, the mainstream of social criticism resumed its 
former concern with the problem of dwarfed and compliant personalities. 
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Yet the Emersonians and Tocquevillians of the new century had the advantage, 
not available to their predecessors, of anchoring their views in crowd psychology. 
A magazine writer named Loren Knox spoke in the distinctive idiom of this 
voguish "science" when he observed in 1908: 
Though we, the people of the United States, boast of our 
individuality, we are regarded today by those who cater to our 
wants as an absorbent mass, rather than as discriminating units. 
... Indeed, the disease of democracy is upon us. We are a mass. 
Our appetite is for uniformities Each of us is under tutelage 
to the mass of us. Every moment we are acted on by sugges-
tions from the demos. One cannot escape the thought of all.50 
Similar Sidisian inflections appeared in an essay by Josiah Royce, who warned 
that "certain modern conditions" give the mob spirit "new form and power, and 
to lead to new social dangers...." One such condition was the "passive and 
sympathetic love for knowing and feeling whatever other men know and feel." 
More potent was the power of communications media "to transmit the waves of 
emotional enthusiasm" among the scattered millions, a power that exposed 
nations to the risk of falling "rapidly under the hypnotic influence of a few leaders, 
of a few fatal phrases." Thus modern society was prone to "the disastrous 
hypnotic slumber so characteristic of excited masses."51 
But it was characteristic of Royce, and indeed of this generation, not to give 
in to pessimism. He confidently prescribed participation in local communities as 
an antidote to the destructive impulses of "excited masses." Others viewed mass 
behavior as benign, or as a crude but necessary engine of social progress. 
Psychologist G. A. Tawney insisted that individuals could enter crowds without 
losing their senses or their identities; E. A. Ross wrote of "times when crowds 
socialize men and fit them for better modes of association," by bringing down 
"wormeaten social frameworks in which people have felt themselves impris-
oned."52 
In short, what distinguished the body of post-1900 social commentary was 
not its way of disparaging crowds, but its growing readiness to approve of them. 
The crowd psychology that established itself in America after 1900 comported 
easily with a progressive ethos predicated on expert management of class 
relations. Crowd psychologists' theories about suggestibility were especially 
popular because they promised efficient ways to manufacture order in a hazard-
ously plural and fluid society. 
After the labor rebellions of the 1890s had been suppressed, many corporate 
managers adopted a conciliatory emphasis, shared with settlement house resi-
dents and other reformers, on peaceably assimilating immigrant workers. For 
proponents of "Americanization," bent on turning millions of immigrants into 
obedient citizens, well-behaved crowds could be seen as crucibles of a healthy 
nationalism. To the degree that a mass society universalized certain values and 
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beliefs, it spelled victory over localism, sectionalism, class loyalties, ethnic 
allegiances and all the other fissures that stood in the way of creating a unified 
national culture. Americanization and mass uniformity were vividly equated in 
the ceremony for graduates of the English School started by the Ford Motor 
Company for its immigrant workers in 1914. The school director called it: 
a pageant in the form of a melting pot, where all the men 
descend from a boat scene representing the vessel on which 
they came over; down the gangway into a pot 15 feet in 
diameter and 71/2 feet high, which represents the Ford English 
School. Six teachers, three on each side, stir the pot with ten 
foot ladles representing nine months of teaching in the school. 
Into the pot 52 nationalities with their foreign clothes and 
baggage go and out of the pot after vigorous stirring by the 
teachers comes one nationality, viz., American.53 
E. A. Ross furnished a subtler argument for embracing the mass in Social 
Psychology. According to Ross the advent of what Gabriel Tarde called the 
"public," gradually replacing the crowd, was a strong sign of progress. There was 
a crucial difference between "government by the mob" and "the rule of public 
opinion," marked by rational and deliberate debate, Ross observed. He added that 
skillful use of the laws of suggestion could enable the Few to educate and direct 
the Many, and made a plea for expert guidance of public opinion. In much the 
same vein, social worker Mary Follett contended that to maintain the vigor of 
popular government it was vital to subordinate the social properties of crowds to 
those of more stable and rational "groups": 
The crowd and the group represent entirely different modes of 
association. Crown action is the outcome of agreement or 
concurrence of emotion rather than of thought... Suggestion 
is the law of the crowd, interpénétration of the group.54 
During the progressive period, "scientific" techniques derived from crowd 
psychology enjoyed rising popularity in advertising, marketing, public relations 
and other fields devoted to manipulating mass opinion. An example is the field 
of speech education. Speech experts traditionally taught that orators moved 
people either by convincing them—appealing to the intellect—or by persuading 
them—appealing to the will through the emotions. Conviction required mastery 
of logic and the laws of argument. Persuasion called for the mysterious art of 
developing communion with the audience. 
Walter Dill Scott, a psychologist at Northwestern University, introduced 
crowd psychology to speech education with a public speaking manual he 
published in 1906. Scott wrote, "Our most important actions are performed and 
most sacred conceptions are reached by means of merest suggestions." In a 
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chapter tided "Rendering an Audience Suggestible," Scott retailed hypnotic tips 
guaranteed to make auditors "accept unhesitatingly almost any conclusion or 
conception which is presented to their minds." 
The orator who is able to weld his audience into a homoge-
neous crowd has already won his hardest fight. The difficult 
task is not to convince and sway the crowd, but to create it.55 
For several years Scott's irreverent text posed a solitary challenge to 
traditional emphases on rhetoric, elocution and the laws of argument. By 1915, 
however, crowd psychology had staked out a large territory in the speech 
education literature. James Winans, a new leader in the field, wrote a textbook 
that gave prominent attention to the psychology of audiences. Another leading 
expert, Charles Woolbert, brought out studies explicitly analyzing audiences as 
crowds.56 
Academic psychologists continued to give crowd doctrines a more skeptical 
reception, as they had done since the first American reviews of Le Bon in the mid-
1890s. William James readily agreed with his pupil Sidis that, as Sidis put it, a 
"mob self slumbers within the bosom of society." In a letter on lynchings 
published in the Springfield Daily Republican in 1903, James referred to the 
"carnivore within us." 
The average church-going civilizee realizes absolutely noth-
ing of the deeper current of human nature, or of the aboriginal 
capacity for murderous excitement which lies sleeping even in 
his own bosom. 
But James refused to surrender the whole subconscious to Sidis* "mob self." His 
reading of the mind's "deeper currents" more resembled that of another pupil, 
Edwin Diller Starbuck, who studied religious conversion. According to S tarbuck, 
most conversions involved a new, regenerate consciousness "ripening" within 
the subconscious. This image of the subconscious, as partner rather than betrayer 
of the "waking self," drew sharp criticism from Sidis: 
What Mr. Starbuck does not seem to realize is the fact that it is 
not the healthy normal life that one studies in sudden religious 
conversions, but the phenomena of revival insanity. 
Starbuck retorted that Sidis saw pathology even in healthy mental functioning.57 
Starbuck and another student of American Protestantism, Frederick Daven-
port, observed that the power of "mob-mind" in evangelical religion was 
declining because Americans had "undergone marked mental evolution under the 
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stress of a complex experience and a rapidly differentiating social environment." 
Both scholars forecast important uses, in religion and education as well, for what 
Davenport called "the art of normal suggestion."58 
In the maturing field of social psychology the heyday of crowd concepts 
proved brief. Social psychologists quickly jettisoned reductionist generaliza-
tions derived from psychopathology and hypnotism. Charles Horton Cooley, 
Edward L. Thorndike, William McDougall, George Herbert Mead and John 
Dewey began to insist that human social behavior could never be attributed 
wholly to suggestibility, "herd instinct," or any other singular cause. In 1916 John 
Dewey read an epitaph over the "suggestibility school" that had briefly domi-
nated social psychology at the turn of the century. The future of the field belonged 
not to those who examined "the relationship of a mythical psychology of an 
isolated individual mind to the even more mythical psychology of a mass or 
crowd or public mind," but to students of "the relationship of original or native 
activities to acquired capacities and habits."59 
Boris Sidis scorned these developments, just as he defied the Freudian wave 
in psychiatry. While others repudiated crowd psychology or ransacked it for 
cheerful advice on how to manage the masses, Sidis stuck to the alarmist 
principles he formulated in the 1890s. Soon they congealed into a trite and 
repetitive jeremiad. Speaking at Harvard in 1911, Sidis intimated that his mentor 
James had helped promote the "shallow optimism" that blinded Americans to 
the "cankers and sores" of their social life. "We are in danger," he warned, "of 
building up a Byzantine empire with large institutions and big corporations, but 
with small minds and dwarfed individualities." Sidis held that only psychopa-
thologists like himself could save America "from mental and moral decline 
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Sidis' politics had always been radical (Royce called him a Nihilist), and 
during World War I his hatred of the Romanovs combined with his anti-war 
convictions to make him a Bolshevik sympathizer. So was his son, a famous 
Harvard mathematics prodigy, who was arrested for taking part in a "red-flag" 
demonstration in Roxbury in May 1919. Ironically, Sidis could be accused of 
succumbing to the mob hysteria he had decried for so many years. Though he 
pleaded for the credit due him as a pioneer of social science, pointing out how 
much other investigators had borrowed from him, his politics could only serve to 
isolate him. Sidis' reputation was in eclipse when he died in 1923.61 
Though World War I failed to popularize the hyperbolic theories of Boris 
Sidis, it gave fresh impetus to more modest and utilitarian versions of crowd 
psychology. The years 1917-1920 provided numerous occasions for Le Bonian 
analyses of fickle crowds. More important was the way the war legitimized the 
imagery of inert masses, along with ideas about how to move them. This was the 
enduring legacy of the crowd psychologists, in America as in Europe. Their ideas 
seemingly corroborated by the record of the war and its aftermath, crowd 
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psychologists prepared the way for anti-democratic theories of "the mass soci-
ety," needing the management of scientifically trained elites, that would come 
into their own later in the century.62 
Government campaigns to promote the war effort conferred a patriotic 
prestige on the business of shaping mass behavior. To forge a heterogeneous 
public into a "white-hot mass instinct with fraternity, courage, and deathless 
determination," the Wilson Administration's Committee on Public Information 
developed a host of crowd-making techniques. CPI Director George Creel 
recruited many of his lieutenants from advertising, speech education and other 
fields that had assimilated crowd psychology doctrines before the war. Walter 
Lippmann called the government mobilization of public opinion during the war 
"the largest and most intensive effort to carry quickly a fairly uniform set of ideas 
to all the people of a nation."63 
The persuasion industries emerged from the war filled with expansive 
ambitions and increasingly committed to the use of irrational techniques. Typical 
were the gains made by crowd doctrines in speech education. New texts stressed 
the irrationality of audiences and enthused about the efficiency of suggestion. 
O'Neill and Weaver wrote in 1926: ". . . the true end of speech is not expression, 
and not communication, but rather stimulation, or better yet, control." These 
writers and William Brigance, author of another standard text, gave their readers 
detailed tips on converting audiences into crowds. "Crowd building," observed 
O'Neill and Weaver, " . . . forms a vital portion of the forensic art."64 
In addition to promoting persuasive techniques derived from crowd psychol-
ogy, the war enhanced the prestige of the "science" itself. New analyses of mob 
and mass behavior commanded respectful attention, among them The Instinct of 
the Herd in Peace and War (1915) by the English biologist Wilfred Trotter and 
The Behavior of Crowds (1920) by the American educator Everett Dean Martin. 
The theories of Le Bon and Tarde continued to influence American sociology 
through the students of E. A. Ross, and also through the writing and teaching of 
Robert Ezra Park at the University of Chicago. Park had drawn heavily upon Le 
Bon for his 1904 doctoral dissertation, and in the 1920s he continued to cite Le 
Bon as the preeminent theories of collective behavior.65 
The role played by crowd psychology in sustaining the antidemocratic 
disillusionments of the 1920s can be glimpsed in the writings of Walter Lippmann. 
Crowd concepts first helped Lippmann interpret the irrationalities of the war 
years, then bolstered his conviction that the average citizen was politically 
incompetent. In Public Opinion (1922), a book deeply influenced by the CPI 
propaganda campaigns, Lippmann urged the need for an intelligentsia to manage 
an incompetent public for its own good. The principal means of "creating 
consent" proposed by Lippmann was the deployment of emotion-focusing 
symbols. As Lippmann described it, a symbol was very much like what the crowd 
psychologists called a "suggestion"; it "immobilizes personality, yet at the same 
time it enormously sharpens the intention of the group and welds that group... 
to purposeful action." 
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When quick results are imperative, the manipulation of masses 
through symbols may be the only quick way of having a thing 
done. It is often more important to act than to understand 
The symbol is the instrument by which in the short run the 
mass escapes from its own inertia.66 
In ThePhantomPublic(\925)Liippmmnrepeatedly characterized thepublic 
in terms that resembled Le Bon's descriptions of crowds. "We must assume," he 
said, 
that a public is inexpert in its curiosity, intermittent, that it 
discerns only gross distinctions, is slow to be aroused and 
quickly diverted; that... it personalizes whatever it considers, 
and is interested only when events have been melodramatized 
Commanding the appropriate symbols, Lippmann observed, "the leader is able to 
make a homogeneous will out of a heterogeneous mass of desires."67 
During the 1930s the retreat from democratic principles was halted, in part 
because anti-democratic doctrines suffered from the company they kept. Always 
a creed of the Right, crowd psychology was now publicly embraced by fascists. 
Mussolini professed to have read The Crowd many times; the Nazis' familiarity 
with Le Bonian principles was easily discernible in Mein Kampf and in the 
pronouncements of Third Reich propagandists.68 The gathering conflict between 
totalitarian systems and the surviving démocraties helped to resharpen old 
distinctions between crowd and public. 
New American scholarship on the phenomena of mass thought and behavior 
was devoted primarily to prevention. In a study of propaganda published in 1935, 
Leonard Doob sought to expose the irrational devices of persuasion so that 
individuals could protect themselves against them. Psychologist Ellis Freeman 
attacked the techniques of crowd creation that had become standard items in 
speaker's manuals, and noted that the greatest master of this craft was Hitler. In 
1941 Hadley Cantril defended "real democracy" with a cautionary analysis of the 
psychology of social movements.69 
But for these scholars and their contemporaries there was no longer any 
question of blocking "the rush of the mass" or of retrieving E. A. Ross' "sage 
Emersonian individualism." Though crowd psychology per se hadbeen discred-
ited by the eve of World War II, the mass was universally accepted as the great 
defining condition of Cantril's "real democracy." Many of the premises and 
images of crowd psychology were absorbed into the anxious theorizing about the 
mass society after the war.70 
"There are in fact no masses; there are only ways of seeingpeople as masses," 
writes Raymond Williams. Yet seeing others as masses "has become character-
istic of our kind of society, has been capitalized for the purposes of political or 
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cultural exploitation." Crowd psychology crystallized that "way of seeing" in the 
last century and bequeathed it, largely intact, to the social imagination of our own 
time.71 
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